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conditions under which support fails to transmit to C is correct; we simply
deny that in the voting example (normal) those conditions are in fact 
satisfied.
If this is right, then Wright’s account of why evidential support may fail
to transmit across entailment is validated by a Bayesian analysis, just as the
proof above suggested at first sight. Where B entails C, then if A supports
B conditionally on C but not otherwise, it is true that A cannot support C,
where support is understood in the usual Bayesian way, as enhancement of
prior probability. Wright’s distinction between indirect and direct support
muddies the waters. Relativizing probabilities to background knowledge
obviates the need for the direct/indirect support distinction, allowing us to
accept Wright’s analysis of the conditions under which transmission failure
occurs.
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Some problems for Lowe’s four-category ontology
Max Kistler
In recent work, E. J. Lowe (1998b: Chap. 9, 1998c, 2001, 2002a, 2002b,
2003a) has developed a ‘four-category ontology’ whose fundamental onto-
logical categories result from two distinctions: between object and prop-
erty and between particular and universal. In Lowe’s metaphysical scheme,
inspired by Aristotle’s distinction between primary and secondary sub-
stances, there are two fundamentally different types of individual objects:
particular objects, such as rocks, animals and persons, and universal
objects, the most important instances of which are kinds, such as the kind
oak trees or the kind gold. Particular objects instantiate their kinds.
Analysis 64.2, April 2004, pp. 146–51. © Max Kistler
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1. Particular objects
According to Lowe, an individual1 object is an ‘entity which bears proper-
ties’ (2003a: 11), possesses ‘determinate identity conditions’ (1998b: 181),
and has the unity required for making it countable (cf. Lowe 1998a, Lowe
1998b, chap. 3). Entities satisfying the second but not the third require-
ment are called ‘quasi-individuals’ (1998b: 76);2 entities satisfying the third
but not the second are called ‘quasi-objects’ (1998a: 197, 1998b: 59, 70).
One problem for Lowe’s criterion of objecthood is that it allows entities
to switch ontological categories: something can become an object or cease
to be an object. Consider Lowe’s example of quasi-individuals, parts of
(hypothetical) absolutely homogeneous stuff. Such parts do not possess
sufficient unity to be countable ‘because every such part is infinitely divis-
ible into smaller parts of the same kind of stuff’ (1998a: 200; cf. also
1998b: 201). Contrary to its parts, a piece of stuff, i.e. a ‘maximal con-
nected part of stuff’ (1998a: 200), is countable, hence an object. Accord-
ing to Lowe’s criterion, a piece of stuff ceases to be an object when it gets
attached to a second piece, thereby ceasing to be a maximal part.
True, Lowe allows ‘transubstantiation’, an object changing in kind while
continuing to exist as an object. ‘It appears to be metaphysically possible
for an individual living organism to start life as, say, a cat and yet to survive
a process of transmutation which turns it into a dog.’ (1998b: 186, italics
Lowe’s; cf. also 1989: 103). However, transubstantiation does not 
make anything cross the boundaries between fundamental ontological 
categories.
A second problem for Lowe’s account is that he fails to make a convinc-
ing case for the existence of quasi-individuals: any amount of stuff, homo-
geneous or non-homogeneous, such as water and gold, is measurable,
hence countable, and should therefore qualify as an object. Counting stuff,
contrary to counting more ‘organic’ substances,3 requires an arbitrary unit
of measurement. It also requires a ‘principle of individuation’, allowing us
to distinguish different parts, so as not to count them twice over. The space
occupied by parts of stuff can serve as such a principle. Lowe’s argument
that ‘parts of space themselves, like parts of stuff, very arguably lack a prin-
ciple of individuation’ (1998a: 201), can be overcome. There are objects
such as persons or rocks, which are situated in space and whose individu-
ation poses no problems (first step). These objects can be used as landmarks
to ascribe individual identity to points in space (second step). In a third
1 I shall henceforth omit the qualifier ‘individual’, using the term ‘object’ as meaning
‘individual object’.
2 In Lowe 2003b, he calls such entities ‘dividuals’.
3 Being organic means having an ‘internal principle of unity’ (Lowe 1998b: 15).
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step, parts of stuff (whether homogeneous or not) can be individuated by
indicating their position relative to those points. Lowe still owes us an
argument for his thesis that countability is a non-trivial criterion of 
objecthood.
The problem that Lowe’s criterion allows entities to switch ontological
categories also arises for ‘quasi-objects’, such as quantum particles, which
are Lowe’s ‘example[s] of countability without determinate identity’
(1998a: 194; cf. 1998b: 62). The two electrons in the electron shell of a
helium atom are countable, but not objects because they lack individual
identity: it is firmly established in physics that they cannot be taken to 
be individuals which could be described, as if they were bearing a tag.
However, they become objects when they leave the atomic shell, for only
interacting indistinguishable particles lack individual identity. Take
photons, which, within a system of many photons, lack individual identity.
However, a single photon can become an object by leaving the interacting
system: it can even be consciously perceived. Perceived, it is certainly one;
it is also an individual: I can distinguish it from others by such a descrip-
tion as ‘the photon I just perceived to my left’.
Let us try to modify Lowe’s criterion so as to avoid having entities change
ontological categories. Maybe, to be an object, an entity must sometimes,
or always, have unity and individual identity. Lowe himself suggests this
when he says that electrons are ‘not always determinately identifiable’
(1998a: 197, 1998b: 70). However, this would make objecthood depend
on contingent circumstances. This suggests that we rather need a modal
qualification. Maybe, in order for an entity to be an object it must be pos-
sible for it to have unity and individual identity. That would make electrons
and photons objects, and therefore match the intuition that a perceived
individual photon is an object. However, we cannot really say of an elec-
tron in an entangled quantum state that it has possibly determinate iden-
tity (because it is possible that it leaves the entangled state): the pronoun
‘it’ has no definite reference in this situation. As a last resort, we may con-
sider requiring an object to have determinate identity and unity necessar-
ily. However, this is too strong, for two reasons. First, it disqualifies
quantum particles as objects, making them only ‘quasi-objects’. But we
have seen that perceived single photons are objects. Second, against Lowe’s
stated aim, it disqualifies all pieces of stuff from being objects. For no piece
of stuff is necessarily maximal: for any such piece, it is possible to join it to
another piece, thereby making of those parts a whole new piece.
2. Kinds
Besides particular objects, Lowe’s ontological scheme contains ‘universal
objects’, whose main representatives are kinds.4 Lowe’s thesis that kinds
4 Numbers also fall into this category. Cf. 1998b: Chap. 10.7.
some problems for lowe’s four-category ontology 149
are objects presupposes that kinds are (1) genuine property bearers 
(cf. 1989: 148, 2002b: 143), (2) have determinate identity conditions (cf.
1989: 101–4) and are countable, and (3) have ontological independence
(cf. 1989: 162–63). However, it is doubtful whether kinds meet these
requirements.
(1) Kinds do not bear properties in a more genuine sense than (first-
order) properties. Being numerous or rare may seem to be clear cases of
properties of kinds. But Lowe cannot accept them, for he explicitly denies
that instantiation is a genuine property, or rather, a genuine relation
between the kind and its instances. He recommends calling it a ‘relation-
ship’ instead.5 If the number of times a property is instantiated does not
count as a (second-order) property of that property, it cannot count as a
property of a kind either. Lowe’s own examples of properties of kinds do
not seem to be properties of kinds at all, but rather properties of the
members of the kind. Lowe sometimes says that kinds ‘possess’ properties:
laws of nature, e.g. that common salt is water-soluble, consist ‘in the pos-
session by such kinds of certain properties’ (2001: 13; cf. also 2002b:
145–46 and 2003a: 19). But the property of being water-soluble can only
be attributed sensibly to particular samples of salt, not the kind: only the
former but not the latter can dissolve in water. In other places, he speaks
of kinds ‘being characterized by’ properties, rather than possessing or
bearing them. For example, gold is ‘a kind of stuff, which is characterized
by many non-substantial universals’ (2002a: 232), such as being consti-
tuted by atoms with the atomic number 79. However, being characterized
by a property is very different from bearing it. If being constituted by atoms
with the atomic number 79 characterizes being gold, this is because the
former property is a constitutive part of the latter, complex property.6
(2) It is disputed whether biological species, which appear to be para-
digmatic kinds, have a real essence providing an absolute basis for count-
ing them. Against that idea, Dupré (1981) shows that there is no unique
and universally applicable concept of biological species. 1) Morphological
and genetic similarity among individuals is neither necessary nor sufficient
for their belonging to a common species. 2) The ‘biological species
concept’, the capacity to produce fertile offspring, does not apply univer-
5 Cf. 2002a: 236 and 2002b: 140–41. Lowe argues, against Armstrong in particular,
that properties do not themselves have properties in the sense in which fundamental-
level objects have properties, and that therefore the fact that properties seem to have
(second-order) properties provides no reason to consider them as (second-order)
objects. 
6 With Frege, one might say that ‘gold is composed of atoms with atomic number 79’
expresses a relation of subordination between properties, and that the former is a
‘character’ (Merkmal, Frege, 1987: 86, §53) of the latter. Of course, Frege himself
speaks of concepts rather than properties.
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sally, but only to sexual species. 3) According to the evolutionary concept
of species, they correspond to branches of a unique phylogenetic tree. But
first, constructing the tree presupposes possessing a criterion of species-
hood, in order to be able to decide where to situate the branching-off
points. Second, there are biologically real7 species, e.g. parasites, that cross-
classify the phylogenetic tree. Among parasites, fleas are insects, but tape-
worms are not.8 This suggests that there is something interest-relative and
non-absolute in our species concept. In Locke’s terminology, the essences
of biological species are nominal rather than real. Therefore, species do not
have the intrinsic unity that would make them intrinsically, or absolutely,
countable.
Lowe’s answer to this kind of argument has been that it concerns the 
biological species concept, but not the metaphysical notion of a kind (cf.
(1998b: 185, n.; also 53, 187). But there seem to be only two ways of deter-
mining criteria fixing the identity and unity of a kind: either one relies on
the natural sciences studying those kinds or one relies on psychology (or
linguistics) to find out about our naive classifications.9 In both cases, the
identity of kinds turns out to be relative to us, and therefore not absolute.
Hence, kinds do not have the unity Lowe requires to consider them as
objects.
(3) With respect to ontological independence, kinds do not seem to be
better off than (other) properties. Just as properties, kinds come into being
with the first individual instantiating them. One reason one might give for
thinking that particular objects and kinds are equally fundamental (and
thus ontologically independent from each other), is that particular objects,
7 According to Mill, a kind is ‘real’ if there is an inexhaustible number of things to be
found out about it. Cf. Mill 1843, I, 7, §4: 79; and IV, 7, §5 and Hacking 1993.
Having more properties than those explicitly expressed in any finite description is also
part of Lowe’s concept of a kind: ‘There is, in principle, no finite limit to the number
of such characteristics nomically tied to the nature of gold’ (Lowe 2002a: 232). 
8 Cf. Khalidi 1993, 1998. This shows that there is no unique taxonomic hierarchy in
which each individual belongs only to one kind at a given level. It also suggests that
classification in kinds is interest-relative, which would show that kinds do not possess
any inherent or absolute criterion of identity giving them intrinsic unity. Rather, dis-
tinguishing and counting species resembles distinguishing and counting parts of stuff:
first we decide to cut up the set of all animals or plants (the stuff) according to a cri-
terion chosen according to our practical interests. The resulting kinds (parts of stuff)
owe their countability to that criterion.
9 One of Lowe’s main reasons to postulate kinds is that they are required for ground-
ing laws of nature. Cf. Lowe 2001. Metaphysics should not be satisfied with a concept
of laws of nature that does not fit scientific laws. But if laws are scientific laws and
kinds are the bearers of laws, the metaphysical concept of kind had better fit scien-
tific kinds.
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e.g. plants, essentially belong to their kinds: ‘It is true of any particular oak
tree that it could not have failed to be an oak tree’ (Lowe 2002c: 113). This
would imply that individuals depend on the kinds they instantiate as much
as kinds depend on the individuals instantiating them. However, it is
incompatible with Lowe’s thesis that transubstantiation is conceivable. If a
particular object can change in kind, then kinds are not, after all, as onto-
logically fundamental as particular objects, for then a particular oak tree
could exist, even if the kind oak tree does not exist, say because all oak
trees have been transmuted into maple trees. Within an Aristotelian
scheme, the kind ceases to exist with its last instance. The ontological
dependency of kinds on objects instantiating them pleads for putting kinds
in the ontological category of properties, not in that of objects.10
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